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MODERN individualism set up the individual as an abstract unit. This process began with Nominalism in the fourteenth century and culminated in the Enlightenment. Clear knowledge, analysis, understanding, "intuition," "pure reason," seemed to consume the very will to live. The old ethnic impulses were pulverized away in the refining process of reason. But Darwin's epoch-making work has taught us to look within the psycho-physical organism itself for the ultimate springs of action both individual and social. Even in the sphere of animal psychology the dim outlines of a moral order are discernible in the other-regarding impulses and protective activities of the animal family and other forms of gregarious life. We have come to see the human individual in the light of his relation to his animal and prehistoric human ancestors. The individual in himself, with his unique, absolute rights, his self-centered rationalistic conception of personality is rapidly giving place in our thought to a very different sort of individual. The individual of our twentieth century biology and psychology is an individual whose living organism is stored with parental, gregarious and sympathetic impulses, giving unmistakable evidence, that his ancestors were of the gregarious and not of the solitary type. The bark of the dog is an echo of the primitive wolf-pack. The horse's nibbling at his master who is

combing him is, as Darwin observes, evidence of a pre-historic gregarious life in which animals reciprocally combed each other with their teeth. Monkeys protect each other's skin and fur against vermin. All the ages of domestication have not inhibited the instinctive disposition of the dog to bolt his food, an overwhelming evidence of his pack origin. In the same way the prolongation of infancy is indicative of man's gregarious origin. His helplessness is synchronous with the evolution of individual development which was made possible only through some form of protective group life.

This interpretation of the individual is the very antithesis of the eighteenth century view. The earlier view looked upon the individual as a unique center of will and reason which bore only "external" relations to the various forms of group life. The present view sees a complex of interacting instincts as a given background from which and through which develop by a long and circuitous process the will and the reason as the individualizing elements of experience. The common, racial brain-patterns are the true *a priori* outlines which the developing individual will and reason must follow in man's evolutionary ascent.

Of course those who still hold the eighteenth century point of view,—and most of us still do,—those who think of an individual in himself whose being is necessarily "limited" by the growth of institutions, will regard the development of a biological psychology as limiting, as subordinating, as annulling human freedom and individuality. The exact opposite is the truth. It is only through the individual's functioning in a complex group that the differentiating of a specialized will is made possible. The solitary type of animal is as keen in his way as the animal of the gregarious type, but the wider and richer intellectual life of man could never have originated in the narrow channels of the solitary animal type of life. Elasticity, individuality, have been made possible only because the increased survival value of group life permitted individual variation. The life of the solitary animal was neither sufficiently secure nor wide

enough in its range to put a premium upon useful variation from hereditary types of behavior.

The self of individualism is the product of the older rationalistic psychology, a psychology founded on individual introspection. But the self of modern biological psychology is not co-terminous with volition and reason. Volition and reason represent the individual aspect of the self, the higher, human, phase of experience. But there is another, an historically earlier, a psychologically deeper, aspect of experience,—the racial, instinctive phase of experience. This racial phase of the mind is as old as animal life and it is as deeply implanted in our nature as in that of the animal. In this racial level of the mind are the instinctive roots of both egoism and altruism, of individual and of social behavior. Here are the fundamental ground patterns which link the individual to the world of his fellows. And it is this aspect of experience that individualism has overlooked. It is not so much that we need a new view of society as that we need a larger view of the human self. The unique self of historical individualism is the result of a comparatively new individual self-consciousness which has not yet adjusted itself to the older, racial elements of experience. Ethical devotion to a unique consciousness of self which has not learned to test itself by the older racial patterns of experience is a form of sentimentalism which is not only dangerous to society but gives to the individual a false conception of himself and of his place in the scheme of life. Rationalism, for example, insists on opposing the instincts to the will; the former are “animal,” the latter is “spiritual.” But instinct and emotion are opposed to the free development of the rational will only if the will be defined in a narrow individualistic fashion. The family, the state, the world of industry and of religion, are not the product of the “individual” reason; they are the product of the reason interpreting and directing the deeper racial instincts. An individualistic ideal of conduct evolved through introspection will of course find its “inner,” its higher interests “limited” by the racial pre-

dispositions inherited from an animal ancestry. On the other hand a will which interprets its function not in an *a priori* manner but empirically fashions its ideals on the racial patterns provided in the instincts will not regard itself as "limited" by an animal ancestry. It will rather find in these instinctive patterns the rough outlines through which it may enlarge itself by identifying itself with the larger life of the race.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century, with all its individualism, regarded all forms of social organization as the product of the reason. From the time of Socrates reason has been defined as an operation of the mind which in some mysterious way evolved "universals." Sensations were regarded as discrete units. In themselves they were treated as absolutely chaotic. The only unity in the world of sense-experience was imported into it by the "universalizing" process of thought. But biology and comparative and genetic psychology have made this rationalistic account of experience absolutely unreal to us. If we try to kill a spider, or watch a hill of ants; if we study a bird rearing her young; if we acquaint ourselves with the unwritten code of behavior of the wolf-pack, we see that natural selection has preserved certain uniform rules of the game of life. We do not see the disconnected and confused world of sensations with which our traditional rationalistic philosophy has made us acquainted. Instead of this "blooming, buzzing confusion," we see creatures coming into the world with already established "action-patterns" which give form and order to the earliest sensations and feelings. And these instinctive ground-patterns of behavior are precisely of the same sort in us men as we observe in the animals. They not only exist prior to experience, to intelligence, to reason, but because they are prior to reason and because their patterns are fixed independently of the individual, these instinctive ground-patterns or action-patterns constitute the rough outlines which behavior must take. Indeed they are, they constitute behavior, so far as its broad outlines are concerned.

Now it is the inheritance of these action-patterns from our animal ancestors which gives us the rough outlines which our human behavior must assume. We are gregarious, we share our comrades' emotions, we love individuals of the opposite sex, we work together to destroy our enemies and to preserve our social groups for precisely the same reasons that animals do. We do these things because it is natural to do them.

When we attend to new things, when we analyze, when we think, we always experience strain and, if these processes be continued, we experience fatigue. Such processes are highly unstable because they involve the newest, the latest, the individually acquired cerebral habits. But when we fight, play golf, swim, hunt game; when our pulse beats more rapidly at the sound of fife and drum; when our hearts warm at the sight of a flag; when we experience uncontrolled tendencies to run at the sound of such words as fire! or murder!—we experience a releasing of forces hidden within us whose power to respond sweeps aside all our individually acquired tendencies, our reason and will, like chaff before the wind.

The *a priori* ends of conduct are not stored in the individually acquired connections of the cerebrum; they exist in the deeper action-patterns which are racial in origin. How old the race is we do not know, but the individual is but three score and ten years. We do not know if any of all the reactions acquired by the individual's seventy years of experience modify the racial patterns of behavior which are nature's original endowment. Our individual minds are complex eddies within the larger stream of racial experience. The "intuitions" and *a priori* truths of individualistic rationalism,—once so precious and valuable,—seem to us officious and presumptuous. Free imagery, poetic and scientific imagination, symbolic thought, the representative use of universal ideas, have actually made our human world. Not to be able to live in this world of abstract ideas is to be less than human. Nevertheless this whole world of free imagery is but the long-circuiting

of the will to live whose fundamental ground-patterns are stored in the individual by natural selection in the form of instinctive predispositions. The individual as an individual does not necessarily count in the long run. Thought and will are not in themselves necessarily worth while. Only those individuals whose thought has learned to interpret aright the ground-patterns through which alone nature has made life possible and whose will has been trained in loving obedience to these laws of nature,—to use Huxley's words,—can permanently count in the world.

Reason and will are just as real elements of experience as instinctive dispositions. This is a point which the newer biological type of thought of our own age is apt to overlook. Nevertheless individual variation, rational selection, thought and will, must prove their worth in terms of race value. The individual self must still be regarded as an end and never as a means,—as the eighteenth century has forever made clear. But our conception of the individual self must be enlarged to include its organic relations to the family, to the state and to the race. Only an individual of this type can be an end in himself.

There is a social motive behind the current emphasis on realism. The various idealisms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whether of the analytic type of Berkeley or of the phenomenalist form of Hume or the voluntaristic form of Fichte, were weapons of warfare which the human mind used in its fight for freedom. Idealism meant a justification of the human intellect in its attempt to deal with the hard and fast objective facts of the external world. Today this type of idealism is used only as a form of defense against materialism. Our age is realistic, rather than idealistic. This means on its social side that the individual will and reason are a part of a deeper and wider and more permanent nature process. As idealism emphasized the inner, mental, rational side of nature, realism is now emphasizing the objective, biological, unconscious aspect of nature. Berkeley and Hume and Fichte are too self-conscious, too introspective to fit the

mood of our biological age. This does not mean that introspection is wrong; it is as rare and as precious as ever. But the old emphasis is too onesided, too inadequate to express the world as we know it to-day. A will which is chronically conscious of being "limited" by "external" reality is a will which is on the defensive; it savors of the pathological. The reflex motor patterns of digestion, circulation, respiration; the instinctive patterns of fear, anger, gregariousness and parental affection, do not originate in the "ideas," the consciousness, the will of the individual mind. As soon as we become intelligently aware of our own behavior we find a real world given to us through these inherited motor patterns with which our brain is stored. And this sort of experience is conducive to a realistic attitude toward the world. As we develop more rational control over the processes of the mind a more idealistic world view will be possible. But our own age has emphasized the unconscious instinctive ground-plan of our experience so that our philosophy has taken the realistic turn.

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